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Enterprises are held to be the foundation stone of the whole economic system 
and even the overall social system in today’s world. Since 1990s, especially after the 
breakout of Asian financial crisis followed by a succession of bankruptcy of some 
famous companies and quickening of economic globalization paces, the governance 
of modern companies has already been a research and practice subject worldwide, and 
even formed a large-scale movement on corporate governance principles. Meanwhile, 
the birth and development of China security markets are accompanied by illegal acts 
that are done by listed companies to creditors , small and medium stockholders and 
worsening too, therefore, how to standardize the acts of listed companies, improve the 
corporate governance, becomes a great project that China needs to cope with. 
Taking Sichuan Topsoft Investment Co., Ltd(Topsoftware for short).as the 
research subject , this thesis, from the perspective of corporate governance and the 
new institutional economics, analyzes the corporate governance defects which 
underlie the acts that Topsoftware provides huge-amount illegal guaranty and free 
short-term loan for its affiliated parties, and arrives at conclusion through thorough 
research and puts forward policy recommendations on how to improve our corporate 
governance . The innovation of this thesis lies in the analysis of background causes of 
these two main illegal acts of listed companies, in terms of corporate governance and 
the new institutional economics, and the probe into the profound reasons why listed 
companies provide huge-amount illegal guaranty and affiliated parties occupy the 
funds, huge losses of listed companies are caused by poor corporate governance. 
Conclusions of this thesis are as follows:  
1. The power of the ultimate controller (the key-person) of Topsoftware is 
over-centralized, which makes internal corporate governance and controlling 
mechanism practically perform no function. This kind of situation is of certain 
universal significance to the listed companies of China.  
2. The absence and loss of corresponding systems result in unable supervision 
and management, similar illegal acts may be spread in certain period; therefore, the 
institutional improvement is so urgent that admits no delay.  















poses the “information barrier’ which makes the huge-amount illegal guaranty of the 
listed companies beyond its own capacity undetected by supervision and management 
sector in time, and leads to the credit funds loss and the accumulated financial risks. 
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担保总额逾 10 亿元，占公司净资产的 672.42%，而且 29 项担保中有 28 项均未
履行董事会正常审议程序；ST 达尔曼违规担保 10 亿元，公司总经理单巨仁离职，
实际控制人许宗林携款数亿潜逃，①而托普软件、和光商务、中科健等公司也相
继引爆违规担保地雷。托普软件 2004 年年报披露累计担保发生额 23.33 亿元，
对外担保余额 15.22 亿元，违规担保总额 17.32 亿元，违规担保总额位居沪深股
市第二（ST 中科以 42 亿元的违规担保名列榜首）。②违规担保将一批公司拖入困
境，一些公司因此难以维持正常的生产经营，从而成为上市公司的重负。 
2005 年 6 月 13 日，沪深两大证券交易所对 2004 年上市公司年报的事后审
核工作基本完成。统计显示，关联方资金占用和上市公司违规担保仍是问题的核
心。沪市已经披露 2004 年度报告的 836 家上市公司中，共有 483 家公司为他人
提供了担保，占已披露年报公司总数的 58%，累计担保余额达 1162.63 亿元，平
均每家 2.41 亿元。 担保金额 高的前 30 家公司累计担保余额达到了 511 亿元，
占全部公司担保总额的 44%。截至 2004 年 12 月 31 日，存在违规担保的上市公
司家数为 148 家，违规担保总额为 238.83 亿元，平均每家 1.61 亿元，担保风险
仍然较大。2004 年年报披露关联方资金占用余额为 478 亿元，较 2003 年度下降






                                                        
①家和.数额不断扩大 治理违规担保须祭重拳 http://finance.sina.com.cn  2005－04－20 
②赵鹏、蔡战波.公司年报中隐藏七大黑幕 繁华背后问题不容小视.中国网 2005 －04 －29  
③蒋娅娅. 2004 年沪市 148 家上市公司违规担保达 238.83 亿. 















   深市上市公司情况也颇为相似。据统计，深市上市公司 2004 年约有 70%的
公司发生向关联方提供资金(特指非经营性)的行为，发生额合计超过 435 亿元，
余额为 359 亿元，与 2003 年的发生额和余额相比分别减少 65%和 15%。其中，向
大股东及其子公司提供资金发生额为 312 亿元，年末余额为 237 亿元，分别占






大的 10 家公司集中了市场约 37%的风险。同时，这些公司的违规担保情况也
比较严重，且多发生在以前年度，在 2004 年也未得到有效解决。  
近年来，由于不少上市公司因巨额违规担保和关联方资金占用等问题，导致
正常的生产经营活动受到严重影响，有的上市公司已经濒临退市的边缘。另据统
计，自 2003 年 1 月至 2005 年 6 月 10 日的近两年半时间，上海证券交易所和深
圳证券交易所公开谴责的上市公司案例共 97 件，被谴责的违规行为合计 131 次，
其中，未披露重大担保事项的有 34 次，占违规行为总次数的 26％，未披露大股













                                                        
①汤涵婷.上市公司关联方担保、占资两“恶习”改观有限 http://finance.tom.com 2005－06－15 









































自 20 世纪 90 年代开始，特别是亚洲金融危机爆发以后，现代公司治理问题
已经成为一个世界范围的研究和实践课题，甚至可以说形成了一场规模盛大、种
类繁多的公司治理原则运动。世界上 早涉足公司治理原则的是英国，20 世纪
90 年代初，基于 80 年代不少英国著名公司的相继倒闭，英国成立了世界上第一
                                                        

































济合作与发展组织（OECD）于 1999 年 5 月通过的《OECD 公司治理原则》影响
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